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ABSTRACT  
Nigeria became the first country in Africa to adopt a comprehensive legislation criminalizing money 
laundering. The Money Laundering Act No 3 of 1995 as amended in MLA No. 46 2003 is the process 
by which illegitimate or “dirty fund” derived from illegitimate business are channeled into the financial 
system in order to conceal or disguise their true origin and make them appear to have come from a clean 
or legitimate source. MLA was designed to check corruption, sharp practices and illegal activities in the 
financial system. The banking system is the medium through which funds flow into and out of the 
country. Some factors were identified as causes of fraud and illegitimate acquisition of wealth. This 
study empirically tested if there is no significant relationship between deposits on the one hand, and the 
following explanatory variables-fraud, actual/expected loss and MLA between 1989 – 2004. The 
Ordinary Least Square method (OLS) was employed in the study. Furthermore, correlation coefficient, t-
test , F-test and the standard error were used in testing the relationship between the variables formulated 
in the hypotheses. From the four tests carried on the fitted regression model, three of them show that the 
regression is very useful in explaining variability in deposits. More importantly, it has been proved that 
money laundering act has a positive impact on the amount of deposits in Nigeria.  
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1.1   INTRODUCTION 
   Money Laundering simply connote disguising financial assets, so that they can be used without 
detection of the illegal activity that produced them. The magnitude of money laundering activities on the 
image and national economy is enormous and frightening, 
   This illicit trade has pervaded both the national and international business and banking industry with 
unabated vigour. Osilowo (2004: 1-4) explained money laundering as the process by which criminals 
attempt to conceal the true origin and ownership of the proceeds of their criminal activities. Cash lends 
anonymity to many forms of criminal activity and is the normal medium of exchange in the world of 
drug trafficking. The most common form of money laundering that banks encounter on a daily basis 
takes the form of accumulated cash transactions which will be deposited in the banking system or 
exchange for valued items such as bank drafts; bank cheques; money orders e.t.c. New detailed 
regulations have been introduced in many countries to strengthen detection of money laundering and to 
improve the supervision of financial institutions. 
    Over time, corruption has heightened beyond the imagination of regulatory initiatives. Vogl (1998: 
33) stated that estimates of the present scale of money laundering transactions are almost beyond 
imagination (about 2 to 5 percent of global GDP). Money laundering is the after effects of international 
corruption, and efforts to curb money laundering can help to minimize corruption. The linkage between 
those who take bribe must find safe international financial channels through which they can bank their 
ill-gotten gains. Those who provide the bribes may well assist the bribe takers to establish safe financial 
channels to launder the cash. Majority of the world‟s largest banks all of which are headquartered in the 
leading industrial countries are used in the global money laundering game. 
   The objectives of the Money Laundering Act are to criminalize the laundering of the proceeds of 
organized crimes and to check the incidence of financial malpractices in the country, the proceeds of 
which are usually siphoned to other countries. It is against this backdrop that this paper attempts to look 
at money laundering act as a tool for monitoring deposits and frauds, causes of frauds and financial 
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malpractices and prevention. Section 1 of this paper, therefore discusses the statement of problem and 
scope of study. Section 2 focuses on the theoretical or analytical framework while Section 3 contains the 
research methodology and model specification. Section 4 dwells on data presentation and analysis. The 
paper ends with conclusion and recommendation. 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
      Globally, and in Nigeria today, money laundering is the process by which illegitimate business are 
channeled into the financial system in order to conceal their true origin. Fraud perpetrated in the banking 
industry through money laundering has been a concern to the shareholders, regulatory authorities and 
the public at large. Frauds constitute a threat to the continued corporate existence of an organization. 
The growth of bank frauds over the years has constituted a worrisome issue to individuals and corporate 
individuals. This is because majority of the stakeholders, retirees, customers, present employee e.t.c   
rely on the banks for payment. Stemming the tide of bank frauds will go a long way in alleviating the 
economic hardship being experienced currently by these categories of citizens and would help again in 
reassuring the stakeholders, raising their confidence level in the system and avert the revocation of a 
bank‟s license. 
1.3   SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 This study is limited to insured banks in Nigeria, commercial and merchant banks inclusive. Insured 
banks have their deposits liabilities insured with the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC). The 
findings of this research will be very useful to the regulatory authorities to know if there is significant 
improvement since the introduction of MLA in 1995 and also in applying the Money Laundering Act to 
bank and non-bank financial institutions in the future 
2.1      ANALYTICAL/THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
From inception of the Money Laundering Act in 1995, the bank and other financial institutions had no 
legal obligation to verify the source of funds or to report the lodgments of suspicious or very huge 
amount of money to the authorities. The implication of this lapse was that the financial institutions are 
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legally incapacitated to perform their patriotic duties as good corporate citizens by instantly reporting 
suspicious deposits to the authorities. Money Laundering has continued to eat deep into the economic 
and social fabric of our society, living in its trail, a battered and heavily debilitating socio-economic 
structure. 
   The Money Laundering Act No. 3 of 1995 (as amended in 2003) came into force on 28
th
 February 
1995.It is meant to check the illegal drug trade and other drug related criminal activities It will also   
ensure that the beneficiaries of this drug trade will not be able to convert the ill-gotten wealth without 
concrete evidence of the source of such monies. In accordance with the provisions of the Act, financial 
institutions are required to report to the Central Bank of Nigeria all international transfer of funds and 
securities in excess of $10,000 (Ten thousand Dollars) in and out of the country. They are also to report 
any suspicious transactions regardless of the amount involved to both the CBN and the National Drug 
Law Enforcement Agency  (NDLEA) within 7 days of any lodgment, be it cash or cheque, in excess of 
N500, 000 (Five hundred thousand Naira) for an individual and N2 million (Two million Naira) per 
body corporate. The Act empowers the NDLEA to call for the records of financial transaction from any 
financial institution. The Agency can also freeze any bank account pending the outcome of an 
investigation. Penalties prescribed in the Act for violation of any of its provisions include imprisonment 
of between 15 and 25 years. According to Osilowo (2004:2) the stages of money laundering can be 
categorized into three: 
(1) Placement – This involves the physical disposal of cash proceeds derived from illegal activity 
(2) Layering  - Seperating illicit proceeds from their source by creating complex layers of financial 
transactions designed to disguise the audit trail and provide anonymity. 
(3) Integration – The provision of apparent legitimacy to criminally derived wealth. Section 2 of 
Money Laundering Act provides for full disclosure of $10,000 and above or its equivalent for 
domiciliary account and Section 6 requires disclosure of suspicious transactions. All suspicious 
transactions should be promptly reported to the NDLEA  
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Section 10 (1) requires a financial institution to disclose and report to the Agency in writing within 7 
days, any single transaction, lodgment or transfer of funds in excess of  (a) N2,000,000 or its 
equivalent, in the case of a body corporate.  
   Section 14  of the MLA 1995 creates an offence of assisting a drug trafficker to retain the benefits 
of his proceeds. This is punishable by a maximum of 25 years imprisonment or a fine or both. 
Section 15 of the MLA 1995 states that where a director or employee who tips off owners of the 
funds or any person who destroys or removes a register or record required to be kept under the Act 
or any person who makes or accepts cash payment for a transaction of an amount in excess of  
N500,000 or its equivalent for an individual and N2m or its equivalent for a body corporate or being 
a bank fails to report a transfer or from a foreign country of a sum greater than $10,000 to the CBN 
and NDLEA, or being a bank fails to identify its customers in accordance with the provisions of the 
Act shall be punishable by a maximum of 25years imprisonment or a fine or both while a bank that 
contravenes this section may have its licence revoked. Section 21 provides banks with protection 
from suit by customers for breaches of confidentiality and allows the NDLEA to give consent to 
continue to operate an account after suspicious activity has been disclosed to the authoritie 
   Section 2 of MLA 1995  as amended in 2003; provides for disclosure of transactions of $5000 
and above for domiciliary account customers, Section 3 provides that any person or financial 
institution that fails to comply with the requirement of customer identification and the submission of 
returns within 7 days from the date of the transaction is liable to a fine of N1m for each day the 
offence continues. In addition, a bank‟s licence can be revoked. The above does not preclude other 
sanctions to be meted out by the regulatory authority. The disclosure requirements for Section 10 
have now been amended to N5m (corporate) and N1m (individuals) from the existing figures of 
N2m (corporate) and N500, 000 individuals. According to CBN annual report and statement of 
accounts (2003:15-16) survey conducted to ascertain the level of compliance by banks with the 
provisions of the ML Act No.3 of 1995, as amended revealed some lapses on the part of banks. 
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They included non-disclosure of reportable transactions, late, incomplete or non-rendition of 
returns; and inadequate or poor customer identification. The incidence of frauds and forgeries 
persisted in 2003.There were 1,036 reported cases of fraud and forgery involving N3.6 billion,  $3.5 
million, DM 120 and Euro 895.0. Out of this number of incidents, 369 cases of fraud were 
successfully perpetrated and resulted in losses to banks amounting to N1.5 billion, $271,882, and 
Euro 895. By NDIC‟s (2002) analysis, seven commonest types of fraud and forgeries cases are 
presentation of forged cheque, granting of unauthorized loans, posting of fictitious credits, 
suppression of cash/cheques, fraudulent transfer and withdrawals, outright theft and loss of money 
to armed robbers.  
    The Concise Oxford Dictionary of current English (1974:485) defined fraud as deceitfulness, 
criminal deception and use of false representations. Hur-Yagba (2003.83) opined that there is a 
general consensus among criminologists that fraud is caused by three elements called: Will, 
Opportunity, Exit (WOE) i.e. the will to commit frauds by the individual, the opportunity to execute 
the fraud and the exit which is the escape from sanctions against successful or attempted fraud or 
deviant behavior. According to Harrell cited in Financial Standard (2003:11) he argued that no 
matter what we do in life, if we have a positive attitude, we would always be 100 percent in all 
human endeavors. This is even evident in the numerical value of the word “Attitude”. We can check 
this by assigning value to each letter; A=1… Z=26 isn’t Attitude =100.Harell‟s work and 
experiences is from established psychological and behavioural research, for gaining control of our 
carrier. Gire (2005:4-5) posited that attitude tend to vary in strength-some being much stronger or 
weaker than others. The importance of determining the strength of an attitude lies in the fact that 
strong attitudes are presumed to be more difficult to change. People tend to hold attitudes only 
toward objects that exist in their psychological world.  
   The tripartite models of attitudes –the affective, behavioral tendency and the cognitive 
components have implication for attitude change. The cognitive component refers to one‟s 
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knowledge or beliefs about the attitudinal object, the affective component relates to a person‟s 
feelings about the object while the behavioral tendency component relates to the predisposition to 
act in a certain manner toward the object of attitude. These variables have strong implications on 
Nigerian attitude to fraud.   
    Chizea (1991:22) explained fraud as any premeditated act of criminal deceit, trickery or 
falsification by a person or group of persons with the intention of altering facts in order to obtain 
undue personal monetary advantage. He mentioned the following as typical manifestation of fraud: 
cash thefts from the tills of bank by staff, forgeries of a customer‟s signature, use of forged cheque 
to withdraw money from his account with the bank, unauthorized and illegal transfer of fund from a 
customer‟s account, opening and operating of fictitious (ghost) account for illegal transactions, 
lending to fictitious borrowers through fictitious account opened at a branch, suppression of cheque 
by disloyal staff, payment against unclear effects, granting loans without adequate information and 
security from borrowers or lenders. The list is endless. 
    In his contribution, Kolawole (2003:56) attributed cases of frauds in the banking system to 
unskilled employee who are not professionals; our legal system that prolong cases of fraud for too 
long making room for undue interference. Atijosan (1993:29) also stated that frauds could be carried 
out through addition of fictitious transactions, altering transactions through wrong posting of 
accounts and deleting transactions by omitting specific accounts. Archibong (1993:23) noted that 
the long-term survival and growth of any organization depends on how the issue of fraud and 
fraudulent practices in any organization is handled. Ojo (1997:80-83) stated that the current 
economic downturn, unstable political environment and fragile financial outlook in Nigeria require 
adequate preventive and control tools to manage the banks and other institutions and enterprises. 
The notable efforts made by the relevant authorities to strengthen bank regulatory framework are: 
(i) The Accounting Standards for Banks and Non-banks financial institutions (Part 1) issued by the 
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Nigerian Accounting Standard Board (NASB), (ii) The Prudential guidelines for licensed banks 
issued by the Banking supervision Department of the CBN on 7
th
 November, 1990, 
(iii) The adoption of International agreement on bank‟s capital adequacy or Basle Accord on capital 
adequacy. These measures were meant to stem the tide of bank failures by establishing standard 
policies to regulate banking business. Accountants, bank professionals through the audit and 
inspection unit could assist in putting in place and ensuring compliance with the required internal 
control systems and procedures to tackle the problem of frauds and related financial malpractices. 
Section 32 of the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) Act No.22 of 1988 (as amended) 
stipulated “any licensed bank or such other financial institution which insures its deposits with the 
corporation shall be required to provide fidelity bond coverage”. The fidelity insurance policy 
covers frauds and forgeries committed by staff of insured banks. The insurance policy is intended to 
reduce the adverse effect of insider frauds and forgeries on the banks. Therefore, it is expected that 
all insured banks be expected to take up fidelity insurance cover and renew it on annual basis. 
2.2     CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF BANK FRAUDS 
 Chizea (1991) and Atijosan (1993) opined that computers are used to perpetrate fraud and it is 
sometimes referred to as computer fraud. Computer fraud entails input manipulation, operations 
manipulation, and file manipulation, program manipulation e.t.c .The use of computers and on-line 
banking has facilitated money-laundering activities in the financial system. Bank frauds have assumed 
various dimensions the world over. Employees who are reflection of the larger society assist in 
consummating bank frauds. Some of the causes of fraud are discussed below. By NDIC‟s (2002) 
analysis, seven commonest types of fraud and forgeries cases are presentation of forged cheque, granting 
of unauthorized loans, posting of fictitious credits, suppression of cash/cheques, fraudulent transfer and 
withdrawals, outright theft and loss of money to armed robbers. 
The causes of money laundering can be represented in a linear mathematical model:  
ML = f (x) ……..equation (1) 
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Expressing this in a linearly econometric form, we have 
ML= b0 + b1x1 + µ ………..equation (2) 
Further expressing this in an explicit form, we have 
ML = b0 + b1x1 + b2x2 + b3x3 + b4x4 + b5x5+b6x6 +b7x7 + b8x8 + b9x9 + µ  
Where ML = Money Laundering 
            b0 = Intercept 
            X1 = Lack of Experienced and adequate personnel 
            X2 = Internal Audit and Control 
            X3 = Inadequate Book Keeping/Accounting Procedure 
            X4 = Poor credit administration 
            X5= Inadequate job rotation/Segregation of duties 
             X6 = Ineffective bank Management 
             X7= Poor Knowledge of the Job/Clearing fraud 
              X8 = Delay Justice 
              X9= Moral decadence and Wrong value system/Society expectation 
               µ  = Stochastic disturbance term 
According to apriori expectations, b1,  b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8, b9 > 1 
                                                           b2  < 1 
It is important to note that the above model is specified in order to discuss the determinants of money 
laundering, not for a data analytical purpose. The causes of the factors leading to Money Laundering 
activities are discussed below:      
(i) Lack of Experienced And Adequate Personnel 
  In view of rapid expansion in the banking industry in the mid „80‟s, provision was not made to train 
bankers to fill the personal shortage. This led to the dilution of standards and professionalism was 
thrown to the wind. Honesty and integrity, which are the hallmark of banking, took a secondary 
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position. This is reflected in the lack of competent hands among the management cadres of liquidated 
and distress bank. The CBN and the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria should assist to bridge 
the gap by assisting to train the required personnel for the banking industry.  
(ii) Internal Audit And Control 
    There is absence of internal auditing procedures to ensure compliance with standards. This has 
contributed to bank loses as a result of inefficiencies, inaccuracies, irregularities and willful 
manipulations. There is the need to ensure that there exists an independent and competent internal audit 
or inspection unit. Systems of control must be put in place to safeguard assets, accuracy and reliability 
of the records. The need for an independent and competent internal audit or inspection unit becomes 
very relevant. 
(iii) Inadequate Book Keeping/Accounting Procedure 
 Improper bookkeeping record gives rise to an unhealthy meddlesomeness. This has led some 
accountant and auditors comprising „doctoring‟ or window dressing financial statements to present a 
rather distorting or misleading state of affairs of enterprises being serviced by colluding with bank 
management. There should be strong accounting controls and security measures, which are subject to 
periodic re-assessment for the continued good health of the organization. The supervisory control arm 
of the CBN should be strengthen to check inconsistent accounting policies and practices in banks. This 
would in the long run pave way for comparison of bank performance. 
(iv) Poor Credit Administration 
 This is the bane of many Nigerian banks. Many loans granted are not properly appraised. And this as 
resulted in an increase in volume of non-performing assets or bad debts putting many banks in 
precarious financial situations. Cases abound of unauthorized lending and lending to ghost borrowers. 
The Failed Bank (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Decree No. 18 1994 should 
be strengthened while the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) should operate as an 
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independent unit of the government to enable it deal with cases of Advance Fee Fraud „419” whose 
transaction sometimes passes through bank. 
(v) Inadequate Job Rotation/ Segregation of Duties 
  Where a staff stays too long on one schedule, it provides an opportunity to commit and cover frauds. 
Also where schedules meant for different individuals are cumulated in one person, it gives an 
opportunity to also commit fraud. Bank management should avoid an individual with too much jobs by 
employing individuals to fill the gap. 
(vi) Ineffective Bank Management 
 Some of the top management staff lacks knowledge of principles and practice of management such as 
planning, control, directing, coordination and supervision. Thus, they exhibit poor judgment and 
promote fraudulent behavior. Bank management requires training, retraining and re-orientation on 
values. 
(vii) Poor Knowledge of The Job 
 Some bank employees exhibit lack of knowledge of their duties and responsibilities and therefore 
easily fall prey to fraudsters. There is need for training and retraining of employees. 
(viii) Clearing Fraud 
 All parties in the clearing system such as drawer, presenting/collecting bank, paying/drawee bank must 
comply to clearing guidelines. Clearing fraud is an unlawful conferment of financial or monetary 
benefit upon any person through the clearing system to which that person otherwise would not be 
entitled. These include presentation of spurious instruments on other banks that is fake or forged 
cheque; drawing instruments on unfounded accounts by a bank and/ or with the connivance of 
customers of the banks; issuance of bank drafts, manager cheque and bankers payments to other banks. 
When there is insufficient funds in the bank account to accommodate the instrument; and wrong 
presentation of instruments of high value on other banks with fraudulent intent. To minimize the 
incidence of clearing fraud, there should be an enabling environment for employees to work. This 
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implies clean environment, centralize waste disposal, good equipments such as good photocopiers, air 
conditioners in good working order and adequate, employment of high calibre staff/officials assigned 
clearing duties with good track records, motivation of staff to avoid temptation, accountability of lines 
of authority must be clear and supervision and control are very essential in a clearing environment 
(ix) Society Expectation 
    The unquestioning attitude towards who are involved in frauds/sudden wealth especially from bank 
staff that eagerly yearns to meet rising society expectation. There is the need by the larger society to 
change their value system by questioning sources of all wealth. This measure would require 
government support. 
(x) Delayed Justice 
   The lack of adequate capacity to detect, investigate and prosecute reported cases of fraud by the law 
enforcement agents. The judiciary is often slow in dispensing cases of fraud and the non-disclosure of 
frauds and lack of cooperation from the affected institutions because of the adverse publicity it brings 
to them encouraged bank employees to engage in frauds. 
(xi) Other Issues 
    The list of frauds and forgeries in the banking industry is by no means exhaustive in this paper. 
However, it is pertinent to mention that bank staff need to comply with operational guidelines, code of 
conduct, while management need to be security conscious to protect their assets. Banks must render 
statements Account to their customers in order to resolve differences that are fraud suspect. Special 
Squad at the state and federal intelligence division of the Nigerian police should be trained and retrained 
to deal with cases of fraud. Staff dismissed in banks on account of fraud should be circularized to other 
banks to prevent re-employment. All bankers irrespective of their status should be registered with the 
Chartered Institute of Bankers of Nigeria so that the institute can watch over their activities and can 
summon anyone to the disciplinary committee on account of fraud. Others include:  
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MORAL DECADENCE: High moral decadence and get rich quick syndrome are some of the causes of 
financial malpractice in the banking place; employees suspected to have these traits are placed under 
surveillance. These categories of employees exploit the slightest opportunity to commit fraud. 
 WRONG VALUE SYSTEM: The society places too much emphasis on material wealth to the extent 
that we failed to question how individuals come by their wealth. A way out is to question individual‟s 
sources of wealth. 
INSECURITY AND TEMPORARINESS OF EMPLOYMENT: Empirical studies by (NDIC) have 
proved that employees with less security and temporary status are more prone to committing fraud in the 
bank than those with permanent employment who have a lot at stake. Many frauds in the bank have been 
linked to staff on industrial attachment, casual workers and even youth corpers. Temporary staff should 
be converted to permanent staff within the shortest possible time. 
WEAK INTERNAL CONTROL: Fraudsters are experts in exploiting the loopholes in the control 
systems of an organization to defraud. Appropriate measures must be put in place to detect lapses as 
quickly as possible for remedial action 
. 
3.1    RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
This section seeks to highlight or spell out in detail the research design adopted in the entire study and to 
test the hypotheses formulated. The data collected for this study is historical and consists of annual 
reports of Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) - various issues on the subject matter (See 
table 1 below). The least square method is adopted in the data analysis and also to test the relationship 
between the variables formulated in the hypotheses. The remainder of this section is divided into various 
sub-sections scope, hypotheses, model specification, measurement of variable and data sources, data 
analysis, presentation and results. 
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Scope 
The period covered in this study is 1989-2004 and the data were obtained from NDIC Annual Reports. 
The analysis covers only the insured commercial banks and merchant banks. Insured banks are those 
that insure their deposit liabilities with the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation through the payment 
of premium. Descriptive analysis is adopted with the aid of statistical tables. 
Test of Hypotheses 
(i) Ho: That there is no significant relationship between deposits before and fraud between 1989  
                     -2004.  
(ii) Ho: That there is no significant relation between deposits and actual loss between 1989 –  
                    2004. 
(iii) Ho: That there is no significant relationship between deposits and MLA between 1989 –  
                    2004. 
Model Specification 
 In an attempt to investigate the relationship between deposits on the one hand, fraud, actual and money 
laundering on the other hand, this study adopts a disequilibrum model which takes into account only the 
state of affairs of insured banks in Nigeria. In this dimension deposits mobilization for insured banks, is 
postulated as a function of fraud, actual loss and money laundering act. Therefore, the model 
specification is represented as: 
                          Y = a0 + a1F1+a2L2 + a3ML +  μ      …………Equation (1)  
 Where D = Deposit 
             F = Fraud 
             L = Actual /expected loss. 
 M = Money Laundering Act of 1995, being captured with a dummy. 
 16 
μ = Stochastic or disturbance term. 
The a priori expectations are stated mathematically below: 
          ∂ D    <   0 
          ∂ F 
          ∂D   <    0 
          ∂L 
        ∂D   <    0 
        ∂ ML 
Measurement of Variable And Data Sources 
For the purpose of estimating equation 1, the least square method is used to ascertain the impact of bank 
fraud on deposit for insured banks (As shown in table 1). It is assumed in this study fraud has inhibited 
deposit mobilization in insured banks in Nigeria. This implies that there is a indirect relationship 
between frauds for insured banks and deposit mobilization and actual loss in a year. The figures for 
uninsured banks, though not reflected in the data are held constant. This would assist us to show the 
relationship between frauds, actual loss and deposit mobilization for insured banks. The sources of 
various secondary data used in this study are the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC-various 
issues). These data covers the period 1989- 2004. 
 
4.1  DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION 
R
2
 represents the proportion of total variability in the observed value  that is explained by the multiple 
regression of deposits, fraud, actual loss and money laundering Act. Since R
2
 ≠  0, this implies that the 
model explains the variability  which suggests that fraud, actual loss and money laundering act are 
significantly related to deposits in their present linear form. In fact, using the second regression (table 3)  
which is the version that we got when we corrected the regression (table 2)  for auto-correlation, the R
2
 
=0.99.This implies that approximately 99% of the variability in the observed deposits is explained by 
fraud, actual loss and money laundering act on the other hand. Conversely, 1% of deposits variability is 
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unexplainable by the fitted regression model. It is pertinent to note that the larger value of R
2
 is a good 
sign that fraud, actual loss and money laundering act are useful in explaining a considerable proportion 
of the variability in deposits.  
However, we should not judge the adequacy of the fitted regression model solely on the R
2 .
 
This leads to the analysis of F-test of the multiple regression model utility. Given that: 
 H0: a1 = a2 = a3 = 0 (The deposit model is not useful) 
H1  : a1 ≠ 0           (The deposit model is useful)  
Test of significance F*= 49.43 
Rejection Region (RR): For = 0.05, we reject H0; since 0.05 > 0.02.The fitted regression model is strong 
enough to be used for prediction. Although the F-test indicates that the fraud, actual loss and money 
laundering act are useful explanatory variables in determining the amount of deposits, one should not 
conclude automatically that every independent variable in the model is individually useful as well. Thus, 
we test the hypotheses about the explanatory variables vis-à-vis the apriori expectation. It is important 
because the parameters of these arguments represent the additional contribution of the fraud, actual loss 
and money laundering act in accounting for changes in the amount of deposits, given the presence of the 
other independent variables in the model. With respect to the aprior expectations, all the independent 
variables conform correctly. In other words, the result of the regression model shows that fraud will 
have inverse effect on deposits; actual loss will have indirect impact on deposits; and the money 
laundering act will have direct and positive relationship with deposits. By implication, the higher the 
fraud cases, the lower the amount of deposits, the greater the amount of actual losses, the lower the 
amount of deposits, and the introduction of money laundering act will boost deposits considerably.  
 
Given the standard errors of the fraud, actual loss and money laundering act, one can proceed to answer 
the question: which, if any, of these explanatory variables are unrelated to the amount of deposits? Our 
approach is to use the information in the sample estimator, ai. to test the null hypothesis that ai = 
0.Accepting the null hypothesis suggests that either fraud, actual loss or money laundering act  has no 
additional predictive value and therefore could be deleted from the fitted regression model. However, in 
this analysis, the rule of thumb adopted is that if a1 is less than one standard error away from 0, we 
conclude that the independent variable is not a significant predictor of the amount of deposits in the 
presence of the other two explanatory variables. By implication, from the result of the regression, the 
sample estimator of fraud is 0.0039795, which is less than one. This means that the inclusion of fraud in 
the fitted regression model is not a significant predictor of deposits in the presence of actual loss and 
money laundering act. 
 18 
 
 Furthermore, the result of our regression analysis shows that a unit decrease in actual loss will stimulate 
deposits by 15 million, holding fraud and money laundering act constant. Also, a unit increase in money 
laundering act will boost deposits by 225,908 million units holding fraud and actual loss constant. This 
leads us to the conclusion that actual loss and money laundering act are vital and significant factors in 
determining deposits.  
 
Using the t-test for individual ai; 
H0: ai = 0 (that is, each of the independent variable is unrelated to deposits, given the presence of the 
other explanatory variables in the model. 
Hi: ai ≠  0  ( that is, each of the independent variables is related to deposits, given the presence of the 
other independent variable in the model).Since the t1 are  smaller than the tabular value of t = 2.160 at 
the 5% level (two –tail test) and with 13df, we conclude that ai are  not statistically significant at the 5% 
level (that is, we cannot reject H0, that a0 = 0) 
 
Out of four tests carried out on the fitted regression model, three of them show that the regression is very 
useful result in explaining variability in deposits. More importantly, it has been proved that money 
laundering act has a positive impact on the amount of deposits in Nigeria. In fact the money laundering 
act has boosted the post-1995 deposits in Nigeria. 
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5.1    CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
  The boards of the insured banks had apparently failed to institute appropriate controls and sound 
management information systems for all facets of their banks operations; and this has contributed to 
rampant cases of fraud in insured banks. Some of the chief executives were known to have thrived in 
unethical and unprofessional conducts. Lending by management of amounts that were by far in excess of 
authorized limits, without the knowledge and concurrence of the board. Facts before the NDIC, the 
police, and the Decree 18 Tribunal revealed that massive frauds were perpetrated in all the failed and 
distressed banks. For example, a former Managing Director of Gamji Bank gave cash and properties 
worth over N103million, while he was being tried for stealing  N57 million. According to THISDAY 
(2003:25) Investigation conducted by NDIC and accepted by CBN, revealed that the former managing 
director perpetrated fraud worth N1,086,438.33billon belonging to Federal Inland Revenue Service 
(FIRS). 
From the hypotheses tested, the study shows that deposits of insured banks have significant influence on 
the explanatory variables for the period 1989 -2004.f We, therefore, recommend that bank 
mananagement should strengthen their internal control system; employ qualified personnel to work in it. 
This would to a large extent help to rebuild the public confidence in the banking industry. The N25 
billion recapitalization for banks fixed for 31
st
 December 2005 would then be realizable because the 
banks would be in a position to mobilize the over N400 million outside the banking system. Leaders 
who occupy position always want to leave up to societal expectation of acquiring wealth illegally. The 
Money Laundering Act cannot succeed without attacking our wrong societal values. Ill-gotten wealth by 
individuals should be questioned so as to reduce the tendency to acquire wealth at all cost. The 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) should be given all necessary support in arresting 
all forms of financial crimes in the society. This means that individuals (Nigerians) should willingly 
submit names of suspected individuals to the commission. 
 20 
Going back to Harrell‟s analysis, fraudsters should take control of their destiny in their hands. They 
should shun financial crimes, understand the power of attitude, take control of their life, reframe from 
bad attitude, find the purpose of their existence, motivate themselves for positive work that would shape 
their destiny, see change as an opportunity and leave a lasting legacy on this planet. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Summary of Insured bank’s Deposit, Fraud and Actual/Expected Loss                                                         
 
 
Year Y (Deposit) 
  N‟000m  
X (Fraud) 
N‟000m 
Actual/Expected Loss 
N‟000m 
1989 50,200 104,967.74 15,341 
1990 43,411.40 804,196.90 22,482.10 
1991 59,436.90 388,512.70 26,678.60 
1992 88,218 411.75 73.11 
1993 144,791.00 2,543.00 750.60 
1994 177,373.80 3,399.39 950.65 
1995 210,945.60 1,011.36 229.13 
1996 258,968.10 160,068.00 375.24 
1997 314,185.50 3,777.90 227.44 
1998 392,478.25 3,196.51 692.85 
1999 569,798.48 7,404.28 2,780.06 
2000 838,592.56 2,851.11 2780.06 
2001 1,017,195.72 11,243.94 906.30 
2002 1,226,624.12 12,919.55 1,299.69 
2003 1,415,785.85 9,383.67 857.46 
2004 1,321,204 8,309.83 1,804.45 
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 SOURCE:NDIC ANNUAL REPORT AND STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTS (VARIOUS ISSUES) 
 
Table 2.Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is D 
 16 observations used for estimation from 1989 to 2004 
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 INT                       99219.7           201950.0             .49131[.632] 
 F                         .025433            .037276             .68230[.508] 
 L                         -1.2768            14.1574           -.090185[.930] 
 ML                       629942.5           234315.6             2.6884[.020] 
******************************************************************************* 
 R-Squared                     .47545   R-Bar-Squared                   .34431 
 S.E. of Regression          397761.5   F-stat.    F(  3,  12)    3.6256[.045] 
 Mean of Dependent Variable  508075.6   S.D. of Dependent Variable    491218.8 
 Residual Sum of Squares     1.90E+12   Equation Log-likelihood      -226.6993 
 Akaike Info. Criterion     -230.6993   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion   -232.2445 
 DW-statistic                  .41013 
******************************************************************************* 
                               Diagnostic Tests 
******************************************************************************* 
*    Test Statistics *        LM Version        *         F Version          * 
******************************************************************************* 
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ(   1)=  10.0413[.002]*F(   1,  11)=  18.5366[.001]* 
*                     *                          *                            * 
* B:Functional Form   *CHSQ(   1)= .0053599[.942]*F(   1,  11)= .0036862[.953]* 
*                     *                          *                            * 
* C:Normality         *CHSQ(   2)=   .71633[.699]*       Not applicable       * 
*                     *                          *                            * 
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ(   1)=   2.9603[.085]*F(   1,  14)=   3.1783[.096]* 
******************************************************************************* 
   A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
   B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
   C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
   D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
   Cochrane-Orcutt Method AR(2) converged after 20 iterations 
******************************************************************************* 
Table 3. Cochrane-Orcutt Method AR(5) converged after 54 iterations 
******************************************************************************* 
 Dependent variable is D 
 16 observations used for estimation from 1989 to 2004 
******************************************************************************* 
 Regressor              Coefficient       Standard Error         T-Ratio[Prob] 
 INT                      318534.9           100626.1             3.1655[.008] 
 F                       -.0039795           .0059067            -.67372[.513] 
 L                        -15.9074            12.1381            -1.3105[.215] 
 ML                       225908.5           187979.8             1.2018[.253] 
******************************************************************************* 
 R-Squared                     .99497   R-Bar-Squared                   .97484 
 S.E. of Regression           75445.4   F-stat.    F(  8,   2)   49.4342[.020] 
 Mean of Dependent Variable  508075.6   S.D. of Dependent Variable    491218.8 
 Residual Sum of Squares     1.14E+10   Equation Log-likelihood      -129.7750 
 Akaike Info. Criterion     -138.7750   Schwarz Bayesian Criterion   -142.2517 
 DW-statistic                  2.2299 
******************************************************************************* 
 
             Parameters of the Autoregressive Error Specification 
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